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STATE OF UTAH, 
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ARGUMENT 
I. EVEN AFTER THE RETURN OF TAYLOR'S DOCUMENTS, HE 
CONTINUED TO BE SEIZED FOR PURPOSES OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT. 
As the State recognizes in their Appellee Brief, in the 
context of a traffic stop, "[a] person is seized under the Fourth 
Amendment when, considering the totality of the circumstances, 
the police conduct vvould have communicated to a reasonable person 
that the person was not free to decline the officer's requests or 
otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his or her 
business." State v. Higgms. 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994). 
Furthermore, for the seizure to end, it must be clear to the 
seized person, either from the words of an officer or from the 
clear import of the circumstances, that the person is at liberty 
to go about his or aer business. Id. 
-1-
Even the return of a detained driver1s documents does not 
render any subsequent exchange consensual, "]_f the driver has 
cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave." United 
States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1996). 
Here, given the totality of the circumstances, Taylor was 
not free to go. Even though his documents were returned to him, 
he continued to be questioned by Officer Salas. These questions 
were related to the questioning begun earlier. It would not have 
been reasonable for Taylor to simply stop talking with Officer 
Salas and drive away at this point. Officer Salas never informed 
Taylor that he was free to go, nor did he walk away, indicating 
that Taylor could leave. There was nothing in Officer Salas1 
words or actions that would make it "clear to the seized person 
[Taylor]" that he was free to go about his business. Rather, 
Officer Salas continued to question Taylor when Taylor should 
have been allowed to leave. 
II. TAYLOR'S CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS GIVEN DURING AN ILLEGAL 
DETENTION, THUS THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A PRODUCT OF 
THIS CONSENT TO SEARCH SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
After Officer Salas returned Taylor's documents, Taylor 
snould have been allowed to leave "without being subjected to 
further delay by poLice for additional questioning." State v. 
Lopez, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utan App. 1990). Because Taylor was 
delayed for additional questioning, he was illegally detained. 
-?-
It was during chis illegal detention that Taylor gave his 
consent to search his vehicle. Thus, all evidence resulting from 
this search should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and that contained in Appellant's 
opening brief, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Trial Court's ruling denying the Motion to Suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 25th day of February, 2000. 
Hap^y^D'. Morgan 
Attorney for Appellant 
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